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Introduction 
 Overview of antitrust laws 
 
 Price fixing and other per se violations 
 
 Joint ventures and other collaborations 
 
 Mergers 
Sherman Antitrust Act   
 Prohibits price fixing and monopolization 
 
 Section 1 prohibits agreements among 
competitors in restraint of trade or commerce. 
 




Acts Forbidden by Sherman Act 
Per se illegal conduct 
 Price fixing 
 Agreements on output 
 Bid rigging 
 Market division 
 Boycotts 
 
Other conduct may be prohibited under the 
“rule of reason” (e.g., tying arrangements, 
exclusive dealing arrangements). 
Other Antitrust Statutes 
 Clayton Act 
 Prohibits certain forms of exclusive dealing, tying 
arrangements, and price discrimination 
 Regulates mergers and acquisitions 
 Creates a private right of action 
 
 FTC Act 
 Created the Federal Trade Commission 
 Prohibits various forms of unfair competition 
 
 Indiana Antitrust Act 
Penalties 
 Fines up to $100 million for corporations and 
$1 million for individuals 
 
 Up to 10 years in prison 
 
 Civil damages include treble damages and 
attorneys’ fees 
Price Fixing Examples 
 Agreement to raise or fix prices 
 Not necessary that conspirators charge same price 
 Eliminate or reduce discounts 
 Adopt standard formula for computing prices 
 Maintain price differentials 
 Fix credit terms 
 Refuse to advertise prices 
Agreements on Output 
 Agreements to reduce or to restrict output 
 
 Treated like price fixing 
Bid Rigging Examples 
 Bid suppression 
 
 Complementary bidding 
 
 Bid rotation 
 
 Bid rigging is often accompanied by 
subcontracting arrangements. 
Market Division Examples  
 Customer allocation 
 
 Territory allocation  
 
 Product allocation 
 
 Supplier allocation 
Detection and Enforcement  
How do government agencies detect price 
fixing, bid rigging, and other types of collusion? 
 Identical prices may indicate a price-fixing 
conspiracy, especially when: 
 Prices stay identical for a long time; 
 Prices previously differed; or 
 Price increases do not appear to be supported by 
increased costs. 
 Discounts are eliminated, especially in a 
market where discounts were typical. 
Detection and Enforcement  
 Bid or price patterns at odds with a 
competitive market 
 Same company always wins a particular bid. 
 Same suppliers submit bids and each company 
takes turns being the low bidder. 
 Some bids are much higher than published price 
lists, previous bids by the same firm, or 
engineering cost estimates. 
 Fewer companies submit bids. 
 Company bids significantly higher on some bids 
than others, with no apparent cost difference. 
Detection and Enforcement  
 Bid or price patterns at odds with a 
competitive market (continued) 
 Bid prices drop when a new or infrequent bidder 
submits a bid. 
 Successful bidder subcontracts work to 
competitors that bid unsuccessfully on the same 
project. 
 Company withdraws its successful bid and later 
receives a subcontract from the new winning 
bidder. 
Detection and Enforcement  
 Suspicious statements 
 References to industry-wide price schedules 
 References to a competitor’s non-public pricing 
information 
 Statements that a particular bid “belongs” to a 
certain company 
 Acknowledgments that competitors discussed 
pricing or have an understanding about prices 
Detection and Enforcement  
 Suspicious behavior 
 Irregularities or similar handwriting, typeface, or 
stationery in the proposals or bid forms submitted 
by different companies 
 Bid or price documents contain white out or other 
physical alteration indicating last-minute price 
changes. 
 Bidder requests a bid packet for itself and a 
competitor or submits its bid as well as 
competitor’s bid. 
 Company brings multiple bids to a bid opening but 
submits its bid only after determining who else is 
bidding. 
Ready-mix Concrete Case Study 
 Price-fixing discussions at trade association 
meetings 
 
 Criminal investigation, fines, and prison 
sentences 
 
 Civil lawsuits 
Ready-mix Concrete Case Study (cont.) 
 Investigation of six ready-mix concrete 
suppliers in central Indiana 
 Investigation began with tip from informant. 
 Department of Justice and FBI raided homes 
and offices on one morning. 
 Amnesty program for first cooperator 
 Reduced penalties for second cooperator 
 Significant penalties for others 
 
Ready-mix Concrete Case Study (cont.) 
 Penalties included prison sentences and fines 
 
 Sentences ranged from 5 months to 27 months 
 
 Fines totaled $35 million, including a single fine 
of $29.2 million, a record for domestic antitrust 
cases 
 
 Class action suit against six suppliers; more 
than $50 million paid in settlements 
Pro-competitive Collaborations 
 Some competitor collaborations benefit 
competition. 
 
 Collaboration may help companies to: 
 Expand into new markets; 
 Fund research and innovation; 
 Improve quality; and 
 Lower production and other costs. 
 
Areas for Collaboration 






Rule of Reason 
 What is the business purpose of the agreement? 
 
 Has the agreement caused competitive harm? 
 
 Will the agreement create or increase market 
power? 
 
 If potential for competitive harm exists, is 
agreement reasonably necessary to achieve pro-
competitive benefits? 
DOJ Business Review Program 
 Department of Justice will give opinion on 
proposed joint venture or information sharing 
program. 
 
 Provided guidance to Colorado Asphalt 
Producers Association concerning R&D joint 
venture 
 
 Provided guidance to construction associations 
concerning certification programs 
Mergers 
 Two or more companies become one 
company. 
 Horizontal merger – the merger of two 
competitors 
 Clayton Act regulates mergers that create or 
enhance market power. 
 Premerger notification required for some 
transactions. 
Mergers 
 Market Power – The ability to reduce output 
and raise prices above the competitive level 
for a sustained period without losing 
business 
 
 Product Market – What are the available 
substitutes? 
 




 Are there pro-competitive benefits to the 
merger? 
 
 Is one of the merging companies likely to 
fail? 
 
 What power do the merging companies’ 
customers possess? 
Mergers – Special Issues in Road Construction 
 Mergers of aggregate, asphalt concrete, and 
ready-mix concrete get close scrutiny. 
 
 Lack of functional substitutes for products 
 
 Small geographic markets 
 
 High barriers to entry 
Mergers – Special Issues in Road Construction 
 United States v. Martin Marietta Materials 
 Proposed acquisition of American 
Aggregates Corporation by Martin Marietta 
Materials 
 DOJ challenged the merger, contending it 
would lessen competition in the sale of 
aggregate in Marion County, Indiana. 
 Settlement agreement permitted merger but 
required Martin Marietta Materials to sell an 
aggregate facility. 
Mergers – Special Issues in Road Construction 
 A Merger Screening System to Monitor 
Acquisitions Occurring in the Aggregate, 
Asphalt Concrete, and Concrete Industries 
 Template spreadsheets and maps provided 
by DOJ to state departments of 
transportation to collect information 
concerning acquisitions 
 INDOT provides this information to the 
Indiana Attorney General and the DOJ. 
Conclusion 
 Increased scrutiny – high stakes 
 
 Some activities are per se illegal. 
 
 Some competitor collaborations are pro-
competitive, but carefully consider purpose 
and effect of collaboration. 
 
 Some mergers may be prohibited or limited. 
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